AES weekly webinars
Research seminars.
Online seminars, theory talks, and tutorials on accounting research.
Seminar
John Hand · UNC
Big Talks, Bigger Data + Tinier Results = A Wrong Direction
Seminar
Phillip Stocken · Dartmouth
Title to be announced
Seminar
Shunsuke Matsuno · Chicago Booth
Title to be announced
Seminar
Lucas Mahieux
Research seminar
Seminar
Yucheng Liang · Carnegie Mellon
Title to be announced
Prior seminars
Seminar archive
Linked titles open the paper shared for that session.
Theory Talk
J. Bertomeu, R. Frankel and P. Liang
Theory talks: the unsolved accounting millennial questions
Seminar
Eunhee Kim · Baruch
Joint, Individual, and Relative Performance Evaluation under Competition vs. Cooperation
The paper studies how technological interdependence—technologies with positive externalities (cooperative technologies) vs. technologies with negative externalities (competitive technologies)—shapes the choice between relative performance evaluation (RPE), individual performance evaluation (IPE), and joint performance evaluation (JPE) in repeated settings. A central insight is that relational incentives play different roles depending on the nature of technological interdependence, causing the same performance evaluation schemes to serve distinct purposes. Under cooperative technologies, IPE and JPE support a team equilibrium through mutual monitoring, relaxing static incentive constraints and reducing the cost of inducing effort in the repeated game, whereas RPE is subject to collusion. As a result, JPE is optimal. Under competitive technologies, both RPE and IPE become susceptible to collusion, while JPE either supports a team equilibrium when the negative externalities are sufficiently weak or remains optimal because it is collusion-proof when negative externalities are sufficiently strong. As the discount factor increases, the optimal scheme transitions from RPE to IPE and then to JPE, with the possibility that the IPE region may disappear. We also characterize the optimal stationary contracts. Under cooperative technologies, JPE remains optimal. Under competitive technologies, the optimal contract exhibits discrete transitions, moving either from RPE to a mix of RPE and JPE before converging to JPE or directly from RPE to JPE.
Tutorial
Jeremy Bertomeu
AI Literacy for Theory Work: An Interactive Webinar
Seminar
Reed Smith · Indiana
A multi-period model of the auditor’s valuation and fraud detection activities ↗
Seminar
Felix Feng · University of Georgia
When Are Two Heads Better than One? The Organizational Design of Innovation ↗
Seminar
Jordan Martel · Indiana
Dynamic Reporting Bias in Private Markets
Seminar
Karl Schuhmacher · Emory
Reward Allocations in Teams
Seminar
Abhishek Ramchandani · University of Hawai‘i
Quiet Investment: Overconfident CEOs and Capex Guidance
Seminar
Ulrich Schaefer · Vienna
On the costs and benefits of more transparency about equity-based incentives
Seminar
Radhika Lunawat · UC Irvine
On Humans and AI: A Financial Reporting Dilemma
Seminar
Lucas Mahieux · Tilburg
Climate-related Disclosures, Market Discipline, and Banks’ Risk-Taking
Seminar
Seung Lee · Odense
A Theory of Disclosure Timing
Theory Talk
Stephen Huddart · Penn State
Formalizing the language of accounting
Seminar
Agata Farina · Princeton
Hiding a Flaw
Seminar
Ronghuo Zheng · UT Austin
Supplier Performance and CEO Compensation Contracts
Seminar
Hao Xue · Duke
In-House Innovation Rivalry
Seminar
Minlei Ye · Toronto
Don’t Say a Word: The Impact of Auditor Disclosure
Seminar
Daniel Aobdia · Penn State
The Effect of CPA Firm Mobility on Audit Market Competition
Seminar
Snehal Banerjee · Michigan
When Climate-risk Disclosures Reduce Green Investment and Welfare
Theory Talk
Thomas Hemmer · Rice
Mechanism Design in Accounting: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost
Seminar
Richard Saouma · Michigan State
Should Human Capital Development Programs be Mandatory or Voluntary?
Seminar
Xu Jiang · Duke
Disclosure Standards for Corporate Social Responsibility
Seminar
Kevin Smith · Stanford
The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax and Financial Reporting Incentives
Seminar
Volker Laux · UT Austin
Revealing Client Names in Inspection Reports
Seminar
Mario Milone · UC San Diego
On the Efficiency of Inspection Targeting
Theory Talk
Jon Glover, Henry Friedman, and Kai Du
What I learned at the SEC
Seminar
Felix Feng · University of Washington
The Incentives of SPAC Sponsors
Seminar
Lisa Yao Liu · Columbia
Estimating the Value of Audit Services for Private Firms